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I too am going to discuss licensing with you. The word "licens-
ing" was used by other speakers, but they dealt with the situation
in which the government tells an exporter whether he may export a
product. I am going to speak to you instead about private, volun-
tary licensing, the licensing of intellectual property rights: patents,
know-how, trademarks, and copyrights. The subject is of enormous
worldwide importance, and it is relevant to our particular discus-
sion of United States exports. Products may be exported which
have been manufactured pursuant to a license, and services may be
exported which are related to a license; indeed, licensed technology
may itself constitute an export. Of course, technology is in great
demand as an item quite distinct from the products and services
which it may cover. The principles that should govern access to
and use of technology have become a focus of the "North-South"
dialogue between the developing and the industrialized nations of
the world. I would like to discuss these international issues first
and then turn to the subject of United States law in greater detail.
The developing nations have a tremendous interest in obtaining
access to the technology of the developed nations, which they view
as essential to encouraging their national development, increasing
their standard of living, and achieving their eventual goal of eco-
nomic equality. A tension has developed because the developing
nations view their disadvantaged position as a vestige of colonial-
ism to be quickly rectified, while the multinationals fear that they
will not be compensated for the years of research and development
that have gone into the creation of the proprietary technology.
Much of this tug of war has been conducted under the auspices
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which has been endeavoring to formulate a Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology.1 This exercise in negotia-
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tion is a fascinating one for international lawyers because it carries
with it both delicate political issues and legal content of some sub-
stance. The effort is nothing less than the negotiation on a prac-
tice-by-practice basis of what should be permissible in the licens-
ing of technology. This endeavor, as noteworthy as it is, is
presently stalemated over some important differences.
The negotiations are among various "groups": the "group of sev-
enty-seven", the developing nations which now number over 120;
the Group B nations, the developed nations including the United
States; and the Group D nations, the Communist bloc. Much of
the disagreement in the negotiations between these groups stems
from their differing vantage points. The emerging nations are pre-
occupied with their development, while Group B nations manifest
concern for protection of the technology with reasoning based
upon antitrust and contract principles. The participating nations
have informally agreed that any code developed will be voluntary
rather than binding. There still exist, however, important disagree-
ments in the areas of dispute settlement and applicable law. The
Western nations assert that the contracting parties should be, on
the whole, free to choose the governing law with respect to licens-
ing agreements and free to determine how disputes should be re-
solved. They further contend that this resolution should generally
take place by arbitration. The developing nations maintain, pursu-
ant to the Calvo Doctrine2 and similar doctrines, that the host na-
tion should determine which law applies. In this respect they be-
lieve that it is the law of the host nation that should apply. On the
issue of arbitration, if it does occur, the developing nations con-
tend there should be very severe limitations based on local law.
This choice of law versus local law dispute is a major point of im-
passe, and it is one of the reasons that this Code's future is so
much in doubt.
Much of the "piece-by-piece" negotiation concerning the test of
the Code has been over the so-called "restrictive business prac-
tices." It is particularly here that the conflict, between the develop-
mental viewpoint and the antitrust-type discipline used by the the
United States and the European Community, has led to a lack of
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agreement. There is a general consensus that certain specified
practices may be harmful. The developing nations, however, tend
to view these practices as "per se" improper although they do not
articulate the "per se" concept, since it is essentially a United
States antitrust rubric. The United States and the other developed
nations want a "rule of reason" applied; namely, they prefer not to
label these practices as invariably improper.
The kinds of specified practices involved include the grant back
of technology by the licensee, which is to assign back new technol-
ogy so that it belongs exclusively to the licensor; the requirement
of exclusive dealing, by which the licensee can be limited to deal-
ing in only the goods, products, and technology of the licensor; the
use of local personnel by the licensee; the practice of price-fixing
on the product of the technology; the ability to adapt the product
to his own particular needs; and the "tie-ins" of undesired prod-
ucts or technology to the desired license.
There is a deep ideological difference on the subject of export
restrictions. Developed nations tend to permit these restrictions in
the sense that technology may be licensed country-by-country, al-
lowing the licensor to bar each licensee from territory entrusted to
another. The developing nations place particular emphasis on their
exports and thus want to dissuade any restraint that may inhibit
exporting.
Another major area of disagreement concerns the rights of the
licensee with respect to use of the technology when the contractual
arrangement has expired but the underlying patent or trade secret
rights remain viable. The developing nations maintain that as soon
as the agreement has expired the licensee is free to utilize the tech-
nology as he sees fit. This view rests on their rationale that tech-
nology is not private property, but the universal heritage of
mankind.
Extended negotiation has also occurred concerning what types of
guarantees and obligations each party to a license agreement
should accept. There is general agreement that fair and honest
practices should be used in negotiation and that "unpackaging" of
the various elements of technology should be permitted by the li-
censor where feasible. There remains, however, a major point of
difference which affects many portions of this proposed Code con-
cerning whether parent-subsidiary relationships should be gov-
erned by different rules from those applicable to agreements be-
tween parties that are independently owned. The Western nations,
of course, maintain that there should be a more permissive stan-
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dard where a company is dealing with its affiliates. Much of the
North-South trade, however, involves dealing among affiliates, so
the developing nations are not prepared to grant so much leeway
in that regard.
Well, so much for the proposed UNCTAD Code. Its acceptance
is still stalled, as I have indicated, because of these deep philo-
sophical differences. Indeed differences even exist within the
"group of seventy-seven." There are different strains within the
group about the degree to which the members even want this sort
of code, and they disagree about what kind of provisions they feel
are acceptable. As a result, I understand that no meetings concern-
ing the Code are scheduled for 1984 and that the participant states
are going to try to make further progress in 1985. Keep in mind
that a number of the developing nations, including Mexico, India,
and Brazil, have national schemes providing for governmental
screening of international licensing agreements. The proposed li-
cense may be struck down in whole or in part if the developing
nations' concerns on the issues we have discussed have not been
met in the agreement.
Let us make one more international foray, this one involving the
European Economic Community' (EEC), before we discuss the
United States legal scene. The EEC legal system has demonstrated
an abiding interest in the implications of intellectual property li-
censing from its early days. Of course, the national economies of
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the other members,
have a significant reliance, as we do, on the fruits of technology,
and they have their own patent, trademark, and copyright laws.
Since the integration of these nations into the European Commu-
nities, there has been a special problem concerning the effect to be
given the national property rights insofar as they can be used to
restrict the flow of products across the national lines in the Com-
mon Market. Conflicting concerns are posed in this regard; inven-
tion and innovation are to be encouraged through the creation and
protection of intellectual property rights, but such rights are capa-
ble of being utilized as barriers to the integration of the national
economies.
The first major confrontation on this issue was the 1966 case of
Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig- Verkaufs-GmbH v.
Commission of the European Economic Community,3 in which re-
3 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
1 8046.
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straints were tested under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome,4 one
of the Treaty's competition provisions. The Consten and Grundig
case involved an effort to territorialize the countries of the Com-
mon Market on the basis of trademark rights. Grundig, a German
manufacturer of electronic products, entered into an exclusive dis-
tributorship agreement with Consten, a French company, provid-
ing that Consten could not sell Grundig products outside of
France. Through the national distributor, as well as through re-
strictive contractual provisions like the one affecting Consten, the
agreement sought to prevent "parallel imports" from one Common
Market country to another. The European Court of Justice in Lux-
embourg declared that these attempted restraints were violative of
Article 85, which prohibits concerted practices and agreements
that restrict trade within the Common Market.5 The reasoning of
the Court was that Article 85 precludes such agreements which
bring about absolute territorial protection within Member States
and restrain the flow of goods. 6
The same problem was raised in the patent context in 1974,
when both the European Commission and the Court of Justice
considered the case of Centrafarm B. V. and Adriaan De Peijper v.
Sterling Drug, Inc.7 Both bodies applied similar reasoning to strike
down the purported restraints along national lines, this time not
under the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome but under
Articles 30-34, which ensure the free movement of goods. The
Court of Justice held that the territorialization of the Common
Market cannot be accomplished through the application of na-
tional patent rights.8 Although the patent holder is entitled to re-
ceive compensation for the use of his invention at its initial point
of use,9 once the product has been marketed with his consent, he
cannot limit its movement by the erection of national barriers.
The Commission of the European Community has for some time
' Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. LXXXV, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 47-48.
Consten & Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 309-14, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, pp. 7624-30.
SId.
7 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8246.
1 Id. at 1161-67, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8246, pp. 9151, 52-
58.
" Id. Cf. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Bientema-Interpharm & Centrafarm, 1968
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 8054 (patentee
could bar imports from Italy to the Netherlands because of the absence of patent protection
in Italy).
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been considering a Draft Group of Certain License Agreements, a
detailed policy statement as to which categories of restrictive pro-
visions are permitted in patent licensing contracts. 10 A variety of
drafts were circulated over a period of years by the EEC staff with
the expectation that the policy could be finalized when the Court
of Justice at long last issued its decision in L.C. Nungesser KG
and Kurt Eisele v. Commission of the European Communities,1
which is also called the "Maize Seed" case. The court did hand
down the Maize Seed decision in 1982, but it failed to resolve the
outstanding issues as definitively as had been anticipated. The
court's opinion essentially declared that the conferring of exclusive
production and marketing rights in terms of a particular Common
Market country is not necessarily incompatible with the Treaty,
but that the absolute territorial protection precluding "parallel im-
ports" went too far.12 The Court left open a good many questions
concerning what kinds of restraints might be permissible to protect
the exclusive producer-marketer's investment.
Let us turn now to the picture in the United States. The basic
federal laws applicable to licensing are the patent laws, the Lan-
ham Act,"5 which deals with trademarks, and the copyright laws.
State law dealing with torts and contracts protects unpatented
trade secrets. Much of the litigation in the area of licensing in-
volves either disputes between the parties, infringement suits, or
antitrust claims. Because intellectual property rights are in the na-
ture of legal monopolies, and because the antitrust laws are
designed to challenge monopoly, there is a tension between these
two sets of rules that often comes into play. The question, thus, is
whether the bounds of the lawful monopoly have been
transgressed.
A number of the antitrust laws are pertinent: section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which deals with agreements;1' section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, which deals with monopolization; 5 section 5 of the Fed-
10 After these remarks had been presented, on July 23, 1984, the Commission issued the
long awaited regulation. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 on the application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements.
" 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8805.
" Id. at 2058-74, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805, pp.
7539-46.
" Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
-5 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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eral Trade Commission Act which prohibits unfair methods of
competition;"6 and more specific statutes which are also trade laws.
The specific statutes include section 337 of the Tariff Act, which
deals with the importation of products using unfair methods of
competition, 17 and section 526 of the Tariff Act, involving importa-
tion of products which bear trademarks owned by a domestic
owner." Also pertinent is the doctrine of patent misuse, which has
a relationship to antitrust doctrine but is not an antitrust law as
such. The patent misuse doctrine permits an infringer, in effect, to
successfully carry out the infringement so long as the patent owner
is guilty of misuse.
Because of the breadth and scope of the United States antitrust
law, its potential application to voluntary licensing transactions is
tremendous. The "effects doctrine" is still the law in the United
States, although it has been modified by some refining doctrines.
Under the "effects doctrine," domestic antitrust law can apply to
any transaction, entered into by anyone anywhere in the world, if
that transaction has a substantial, direct, and reasonably foresee-
able effect on the commerce of the United States. The United
States antitrust laws, then, can apply to a licensing transaction re-
gardless of the nationality of the licensor, regardless of the nation-
ality of the licensee, and regardless of whether there are United
States property rights or foreign intellectual property rights in-
volved.19 It is possible, therefore, for United States antitrust law to
apply to a licensing agreement between one foreign company and
another, even if the agreement involves only foreign rights.
There has been a refinement in this area of the law, a court-
created refinement which applies to the "extraterritorial" reach of
United States antitrust rules generally. A new doctrine, articulated
initially by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in the case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,20
16 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
17 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
'8 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
1 For discussion of the extaterritorial appliction of United States antitrust law, see J.
ATWOOD AND K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 82-105 (1981); PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J.
Griffin ed. 1979); Sanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the
United States, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
20 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1978). On remand the District Court, applying the stan-
dards set out in Timberlane I, dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 574 F. Supp.
1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983). For further discussion of the Timberlane II decision, see Annual
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has now been adopted by some other circuits. The Timberlane
case applies the basic "effects" test but also inquires whether, as a
matter of international comity and fairness, United States jurisdic-
tion should be asserted in a given case. It may well be, therefore,
that a transaction between two foreign parties involving foreign
technology which has little impact on United States commerce
would be exempt from the application of United States antitrust
laws.
There has been some recent legislation which is pertinent to this
general area. In 1982 Congress considered two proposed pieces of
legislation to deal with the complaint that the United States anti-
trust laws were inhibiting our export efforts. Both of these mea-
sures were passed, although they had initially been conceived as
alternatives. One became the Export Trading Company Act,22
which provides for the issuance of certificates of antitrust immu-
nity to exporters who meet specified conditions.23 The other law is
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,24 which narrows,
or at least clarifies, the scope of the antitrust laws to carve out
exceptions for exporting transactions which do not injure domestic
consumers or competing exporters. This formulation raises an in-
teresting question as to whether a United States licensor or licen-
see can now agree with a foreign party that he, the American, will
not ship products of the technology into countries that are unpro-
tected by patents. Apparently such an agreement is permitted.
There are a number of issues that recur as to the kind of re-
straints in intellectual property licenses which will prompt anti-
trust concerns. These issues include: (1) territorial limitations
which arise because licensors seek to reserve for themselves or
other licensors particular areas; (2) field of use restrictions; (3) ef-
Survey of Developments in International Trade Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65, 112-13
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Trade Law Survey]; see also Extraterritorial Suit Against Bank
is Doomed by Lack of Jurisdiction, 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1142, at
903 (Dec. 1, 1983).
" Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15.
' Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982)). For a discussion of the export trading com-
pany's advantages and purposes, see Trade Law Survey, supra note 20, at 85-88.
'3 The Secretary of Commerce has promulgated regulations concerning how to obtain
such a certificate. Export Trade Certificates of Review, 15 C.F.R. §§ 325.1-325.14 (1984). For
more information on the value of certificates of review, see Trade Law Survey, supra note
20, at 87 n.117 (quoting Donald Zarin, a former Commerce Department official).
" Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)).
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forts to control disposition of the unpatented product of a pat-
ented process; (4) "tie-in" clauses, with which the licensor requires
the licensee to accept products or technology in addition to that
sought; and (5) customer limitations. A wealth of case law exists. of
course, concerning the propriety of these and other restraints ema-
nating from the fertile imagination of technology owners.
The Justice Department enforcement philosphy in this area has
not been consistent, to put it mildly. The philosophy has, from
time to time, been articulated by Antitrust Division officials in
their speeches, which are referred to affectionately as "luncheon
speech law." During the time of the Carter Administration and
some of its predecessors, the "nine no-nos" were espoused in a se-
ries of speeches. The thesis of these speeches was that certain
practices in licensing should be deemed per se objectionable; that
is, they are inherently anticompetitive and thus cannot be justified
on any basis. The practices in question include tie-ins of unpaf-
ented materials to a patent license, exclusive "grant backs" which
require the licensee to assign new technology back to the licensor,
licensee "veto" rights over the designation of other licensees, price
fixing, and others.
In 1981 one of the first pronouncements of the Reagan Adminis-
tration antitrust officials was a reversal on the issue of the per se
rule and the nine no-nos, a course wholly consistent with Assistant
Attorney General William Baxter's desire to liberalize antitrust
proscriptions affecting "vertical" relationships. The present re-
gime, accordingly, considers that "in order to maximize the incen-
tives to innovation, firms should be allowed freedom to exploit
fully their legitimate patent rights in ways they find most efficient,
so long as their licensing practices do not threaten to suppress
competition between the patented technology and substitutes for
that technology, and so long as no other identifiable risk of sup-
pressing innovation or competition in an industry is created." 5
There was extensive testimony before congressional committees
in addition to the luncheon speeches by government officials, to
the effect that all licensing restraints should be subject to scrutiny
under the rule of reason and not the per se standard. Not surpris-
ingly then, the Administration's proposed "National Productivity
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 488 (1982) (statement of
William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General).
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and Innovation Act of 1983" ' includes a provision for rule of rea-
son analysis and a limitation to actual rather than treble damages
in private cases, when intellectual property licensing agreements or
joint research and development ventures are involved. Moreover,
the legislation would eliminate the misuse defense to patent and
copyright infringement except where the conduct asserted to be
misuse constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws.
Finally, let us discuss the United States statutes that permit the
exclusion of imports where the rights of domestic intellectual prop-
erty owners are concerned. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193027
authorizes the exclusion from entry into the United States of arti-
cles concerned with unfair methods of competition or unfair acts.
This provision has been heavily used against imports deemed to
infringe United States patent rights. Section 602 of the Copyright
Act2" similarly bars the importation of articles that violate the cop-
yright of a domestic owner. Also, section 526 of the Tariff Act29
provides that a product bearing a trademark identical to that
owned by a United States trademark owner can be excluded by the
customs authorities. Much of the case law under this statute has
involved products bearing pirated trademarks, situations in which
the imported product has no legal claim to use of the mark. The
vexing question which still defies resolution is whether the United
States trademark owner should be permitted to exclude a product
which lawfully carried the mark abroad, through a license or other-
wise. One argument is that the language of section 526 accords the
exclusionary right with no qualification, while the counterargu-
ment is that such monopolistic use of the statute is unjustified.
The Customs Service some time ago promulgated a regulation pro-
viding that exclusion under section 526 would not be available in
those situations in which the product has been marketed abroad
lawfully by the United States owner of the trademark or by his
licensee. 0 There has been recent litigation questioning whether
this interpretation of the law is correct. I understand that a lawsuit
has just been brought in the District of Columbia which directly
challenges the Customs Service regulation as inconsistent with the
sweeping exclusionary language of the statute. This and other po-
:6 H.R. 3878, S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
28 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
2 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
o See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1984).
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tential litigation should resolve the questions concerning the scope
of the right of United States holders of intellectual property trade-
marks to petition for and win exclusion of imports which allegedly
infringe that mark.

